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Management of Security Risks in the Enterprise Architecture using 
ArchiMate and Mal-activities 
Abstract: 
Security level of the enterprise is one of the main elements that should be taken under 
control in the organization. It is difficult to maintain high security level of Information 
System. Since development of enterprise architecture is targeted on continues business 
flow modeling, it sometimes does not take into account security requirements.  
The paper provides an approach to improve security countermeasures to contribute with 
secure Enterprise Architecture. Filling the gap between Enterprise Architecture model and 
Security Risk Management is done through Information System Security Risk 
Management domain model (ISSRM). To build the Enterprise Architecture model, 
ArchiMate modelling language is being used. Among different risk-oriented languages, 
selection was done in favor of Mal-activity diagrams, which help to provide visual concept 
of Security Risk Management. Structured alignment can show the mapping between 
aforementioned terms and provide the information about most vulnerable points of the 
system. The maintenance of security level will help to make business flow independent 
from the state of Information System.  
The outcome of this paper is an alignment tables and rules between ArchiMate and Mal-
activity diagrams. The mapping link between these two languages is ISSRM. Validation of 
our approach is done on the example, which is taken from CoCoME case study. It is shown 
on number of illustrative pictures. After getting the results, there is a comparison of the 
output between presented method and approach developed by Grandry et.al. (2013).  
Keywords: 
Information System, Information System Security Risk Management, Enterprise 
Architecture, Enterprise Architecture model, security countermeasures, Security Risk 
Management, risk-oriented modelling languages, ArchiMate, Mal-activity diagrams. 
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Turvariskide juhtimine ettevõtte arhitektuuris kasutades tehnikaid 
ArchiMate ja Mal-activities 
Lühikokkuvõte: 
Turvalisuse tase on ettevõtte üks peamisi elemente, mida tuleb organisatsioonis 
kontrollida. Kui ettevõtte äri arengut modelleeritakse on eesmärgiks katkematu ettevõtlus, 
aga tihti ei võeta sellega arvesse turvanõudeid. Selliselt on aga infosüsteemi kõrget 
turvalisuse taset väga raske säilitada. 
Selles dokumendis käsitletakse lähenemisviisi, mis parandab julgeoleku vastumeetmeid, et 
selleläbi aidata ettevõtte arhitektuuri turvalisemaks muuta. Ettevõtte arhitektuurimudeli ja 
turvariski juhtimise vaheliste soeste leidmine toimub läbi Infosüsteemi turvariskide 
juhtimise domeeni mudeli (ISSRM). Ettevõtte arhitektuuri modelleerimiseks on kasutatud 
ArchiMate modelleerimiskeelt. Paljudest riskide kirjeldamise keeltest on sobilikum mal-
activity (pahatahtlikute tegevuste) diagrammid, sest see aitab julgeoleku riskide juhtimist 
kõige paremini visualiseerida. Struktureeritud joondus aitab ülalnimetatud keelte vahelisi 
seoseid näidata ning annab informatsiooni kõige haavatavamate punktide kohta süsteemis. 
Turvalisuse taseme säilitamine aitab ettevõttel äritegevust viia sõltumatuks infosüsteemist. 
Selle dokumendi tulemuseks on ArchiMate ja Mal-activity diagrammide vahelised 
seostetabelid ja reeglid. Nende kahe keele vaheliseks seoseks on ISSRM. Kirjeldatud 
lähenemise valideerimine on läbi viidud ühe näite põhjal, mis on võetud CoCoME 
juhtumiuuringust. Näite põhjal on loodud mitmeid illustreerivaid pilte valideerimise kohta. 
Kõige viimasena on kirjeldatud meetodiga saadud tulemust võrreldud Grandy et.al. (2013) 
poolt arendatud lähenemisega. 
Võtmesõnad: 
Infosüsteem, Infosüsteemi turvariskide juhtimine, ettevõtte arhitektuur, ettevõtte 
arhitektuuri mudel, julgeoleku vastumeetmed, turvariskide juhtimine, riskidele 
orjenteeritud modelleerimiskeeled, ArchiMate, mal-activity diagrammid.   
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1 Introduction 
Nowadays, the term of security is becoming more important and widespread. Information 
System (IS) is already integral part of every business. It supports business flow of 
organization and helps employees to operate with different business processes. 
Unfortunately, security concept is not the main point, which is taken into account during 
Enterprise Architecture (EA) development. The emphasis is made on the continuity of the 
business flow, but not on the maintenance of security level. However improvement of the 
security of the organization will positively influence on all business processes. 
When EA is already developed and business is running, is it difficult to discover the 
vulnerabilities before the attacker will use them to violate the system. Possible risks could 
be mitigated through implementation of controls. Search of these countermeasures is made 
through risk analysis. Unfortunately after controls are defined for some particular asset, it 
is not visible how implementation of these countermeasures will influence on the whole 
EA. That’s why the necessity of designing of new methodologies or investigating into 
extensions of existing approaches for Security Risk Management (SRM) and EA alignment 
remains actual and motivating. 
1.1   Research question and contribution 
The main research question of this paper is:  
 
RQ: How to align Enterprise Architecture and Security Risk Management?  
This paper targets to show how to use existed information from EA model in SRM. To 
make this happened firstly it is needed to go through SRM concepts and methods and 
chose the one that is the most suitable for us. The exploration of them will help to 
understand how security risks are managed. After the SRM Domain Model (DM) is 
chosen, it is necessary to find the modeling language that supports defined DM. Analyzing 
and comparing different modeling languages, Mal-activity diagrams (MAD) [44] were 
chosen as the language for further contribution. The alignment between chosen SRM DM 
(Information System Security Risk Management (ISSRM) [12]) and MAD was already 
made by Chowdhury et. al. (2012) [8]. To answer the defined research question, it is also 
necessary to find the modeling language to present EA model. Through analysis of 
different frameworks and methods, ArchiMate was chosen as a modeling language for EA 
model development. Despite there is already an alignment between the ArchiMate and 
ISSRM [18], it was decided to made this alignment by ourselves, as it will be used for 
further mapping between ArchiMate and MAD. Unlike the already defined alignment 
(presented by Grandry et.al. (2013) [18]) our purpose is to map ArchiMate and ISSRM 
without using any additional models from both sides. The research results are gathered into 
transformation tables between ArchiMate and MAD.  
It is not enough to make transformation just from EA model into SRM model. Since even 
if countermeasures are defined correctly, there is no visible influence on model of 
enterprise IS in general. That’s why it is important to make the transformation back from 
SRM model to EA model. Although it is done through the same modeling languages, it has 
more analysts work than previous transformation. It happens, since in second 
transformation security countermeasures and controls could be presented through many 
elements of ArchiMate [48]. That’s why there are some general rules defined (even more 
as guideline) and analyst should think carefully how and where to transfer the required 
controls.   
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1.2   Scope 
SRM could be done in different ways through usage of different concepts, method and 
standards. This work is specified on usage of ISSRM [12], which helps to define the same 
terminology for two modeling languages (ArchiMate [48] and MAD [44]), which are used 
in this work. EA could be presented through different frameworks and modeling 
languages. ArchiMate was chosen for this work among proposed variety.  MAD is being 
used to present ISSRM though different concepts and map it to the EA representation.  
1.3   Structure 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters, which are conditionally organizing 3 big parts. 
The first part is background. It is presented by three chapters, which give an overview of 
SRM, Security risk-oriented languages and Enterprise Architecture Management (EAM). 
Each of these chapters contains an overview of existing concepts/languages/frameworks 
and is provided with examples and explanations. The discussion in Chapter 2 is made to 
justify the choice of ISSRM in our research. Chapter 3 is dedicated to Security risk-
oriented languages and provided with an example of usage of the chosen one. Chapter 4 
shows how ArchiMate could be applied within the example taken from study case. It also 
contains a description and example-based illustration of the alignment of ArchiMate to 
ISSRM taken from Grandry et.al. (2013) approach.  
The second part presents a contribution of the proposed method. It is presented within one 
chapter. Chapter 5 starts with method overview. Each next sub-chapter corresponds to the 
blocks from Figure 5.1, so each step of our method is described in separate sub-chapter. 
Chapter 5 also has an illustration on application of the proposed approach.  
The third part is validation, which describes the comparison of approach presented in this 
work and Grandry et al. (2013) concept. The comparison is made according to the defined 
criteria. All this is described in Chapter 6, which also contains information about threats of 
validity and summary results.  Last but not least chapter of validation part is Chapter 7, 
which presents the summary, conclusions and limitations of the whole work. It also 
contains the future perspectives for work improvement.  
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2 Security Risk Management  
The Risk Management (RM) is a set of coordinated activities, the main goal of which is to 
control an organization with respect to the possibly occurred risks. Methods and standards 
for identification threats, vulnerabilities and risks could be divided into 4 categories:  RM 
standards, security standards, Security Risk Management (SRM) standards, SRM methods. 
AS/NZS 4360 [3], Common criteria (CC) [10], EBIOS [13], MEHARI [9] etc. could be 
aligned as examples. Mostly all of them consist of process guidelines that help to identify 
vulnerable assets, determine security objective, and assess risks as well as define and 
implement security requirements to treat the risk [12]. From all this variety we will stop 
our attention on two of them: Defense Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation Process DITSCAP [32] and ISSRM. The motivation of reason, why ISSRM 
was chosen as methodology for current research, is also presented in this chapter.  
2.1   Methods and standards for Security Risk Management 
All of methods and standards for SRM have their advantages and disadvantages. For 
example, although the RM standards provide general considerations about RM, they are 
not so much security directed, which is not suitable in our case. To this category belong 
AS/NZS 4360 [3] and ISO/IEC Guide 73 [28].  
In security standards category documents usually have security-specific terminology and 
sometimes some RM concepts, but they are not specifically focused on RM activities. 
These documents are ISO/IEC 13335 [25] and СС. CC is not acceptable for our research, 
because it is not completely aligned with IS security that is needed in our research. 
ISO/IEC 13335 is too much security specified and not as much RM specified. ISO/IEC 
27001 [26], NIST 800-27 [15] and German BSI [21] are SRM standards. These standards 
are focused on RM activates through perspective of security. They provide prioritization, 
evaluation and implementation for the controls coming from the risk assessment process. 
The widest category is called SRM methods. Under this category we can separate such 
methods as EBIOS [13], MEHARI [9], OCTAVE [1], CRAMM [24] and CORAS [50]. 
One of the weaknesses of methods is lack of interoperability between these approaches and 
lack of alignment with standards. Although all of them consist of almost same steps 
(identification of the assets, threats, vulnerabilities, risk assessment, determination of 
security requirements), these methods cannot provide finished model as an outcome 
(besides CORAS method). The drawback of CORAS is disconnection from standard 
terminology [38]. The main disadvantage of mainly all aforementioned methods and 
standards is the way of output of the documents. It is composed in informal way, what is 
leading to the inconvenience in automatization. To sum up all limitations, we can consider 
that none of these methods is suitable for us. 
According to defined goal in Chapter 1 we need to find an alignment between two different 
concepts. For better graphical understanding it should be done in the way of model. Hence, 
we will compare two concepts which could provide visible outcome. One of them is 
Defense Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DITSCAP), which presents DITSCAP Requirements DM [17], and the second is ISSRM 
with ISSRM DM. 
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2.2   DITSCAP Requirements Domain Model 
DITSCAP Requirements DM is used for effective decision-making activities regarding 
their interpretation, applicability, and implementation effectiveness in the IS [16]. Building 
of the model consists of different steps. In the center of the whole analysis stays the 
Certification and Accreditation (C&A) of the requirements. Security requirements based 
on C&A are defined in many regulatory documents, which could be even interconnected. 
Unfortunately these documents could have a different level of abstraction. To fulfill the 
main goal and support an overall risk-based strategy it is necessary to build DM. The Risk 
and Requirements (R&R) DM should consist of relevant risk components, such as threats 
and vulnerabilities of the assets to be protected and countermeasures to mitigate or reduce 
the vulnerabilities. The natural language description of basic risk components is taken from 
CC security model. They are extended and presented in the R&R DM, which is shown on 
the Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1. DITSCAP Risk and Requirements DM adapted from [16] 
2.3   ISSRM Domain Model 
ISSRM DM is the method, the main objective of which is defined as the protection of 
essential IS constituents against all harm to information security. ISSRM DM is structured 
around three groups of concepts: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk 
treatment-related concepts [38]. ISSRM DM (see Figure 2.2) supports definition of 
security for the main parts of information systems and addresses the IS security risk 
management process at its three different aforementioned conceptual levels [12]. 
ISSRM DM consists of 3 concepts: asset-related concepts, risk-related concepts and risk 
treatment-related concepts. The outcome of each gives us fundamental understanding 
about assets, vulnerabilities and threats. For example, asset-related concepts provide the 
information about assets of the system, which must be protected. The term asset in general 
stands for anything that has been valued for the organization and it is necessary for 
achieving its goals.  In DM, which is presented in Figure 2.2, assets are divided into 
business assets and IS assets. IS assets supports business assets, which are aiming to 
achieve goals of organization. Furthermore criteria to guarantee asset security are 
described in these concepts. Security criterion identify which security criterion should be 
12 
 
obtained by business assets. The examples of security criterion are: availability, 
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, and accountability. Risk-related concepts 
describe the risk itself and its components. Risk is a combination of threat with one or 
more vulnerabilities leading to a negative impact harming one or more of the assets [12]. 
Risk could be accomplished through potential attack, which is made by agent, who wants 
to harm on one more system assets. This attack is named threat. Attack method defines a 
way of implementation of attack by threat agent, where threat agent is a person who can 
potentially cause harm to the assets of IS. The potential negative consequence of the risk, 
which can possible harm asset through threat, is called impact. Vulnerability is a 
characteristic of an IS asset that can contribute a weakness or a flaw in terms of IS security 
[12]. Risk treatment-related concepts provide advices for decisions, requirements and 
controls, which should be implemented to prevent or mitigate possible risks. Risk 
treatment is a decision treatment of identified risk [12]. It could be avoiding, reducing, 
transferring and retaining the risk. Security requirement is a condition of the environment 
that we wish to make true by implementing the IS, in order to mitigate risks [12]. Control 
is a designed means to improve security, specified by a security requirement and 
implemented to comply it [12]. 
 
Figure 2.2. ISSRM DM adapted from [38] 
2.4   Comparison of Security Risk Management Domain Model 
In both ISSRM DM and DITSCAP R&R DM the components have the same descriptions.  
Asset – anything that has a value to the organization and is necessary for achieving its 
objectives. Threat is a potential harmful attack of one or more assets, leaded by threat 
agent. Risk consists of threats with one or more vulnerabilities, which are leading to a 
harming negative impact of assets. Vulnerability shows the weakness of flow in IS asset or 
group of them.  Risk consists of threats with one or more vulnerabilities, which are leading 
to a harming negative impact of assets. Vulnerability shows the weakness of flow in asset 
or group of them.   
The main advantage of the DITSCAP R&R DM is that it is built around security 
requirement. Talking about the enterprise, during risk assessment the main security 
requirement should be identified. In this case all further development of the DM will be 
built on its bases.  
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ISSRM DM gives more information than DITSCAP DM, which shows the biggest 
advantage of this DM. For example, DITSCAP DM does not cover the risk treatment 
concept at all. It does not provide the information about possible controls that could be 
implemented in order to mitigate the risk.  
The way of modeling the chosen DM is important in our research. In case of DITSCAP 
Requirements DM, the modeling phase will be done by GENeric Object Model meta-
language. It is only one modeling language with which there is alignment. However this 
meta-language has it’s toolkit with helps to  automate it. This gives advantage for this DM. 
A number of modeling languages (like Mal-activities, Secure Tropos, Misuse Cases etc.) 
are aligned to the ISSRM DM. All of these languages have different purposes. The variety 
of them makes ISSRM DM more suitable for our research than DITSCAP DM.   
Both models have their advantages and disadvantages. The usage of each of them could be 
more sufficient regarding to the situation. We defined the necessary criteria for comparison 
of two DMs, which could help to choice the most suitable model for the particular 
situation. The actual comparison is in the Table 2.1, where + means fully covered, - -not 
covered at all, +/- - not full covered.  
Table 2.1. DITSCAP Requirements DM and ISSRM DM comparison 
 Visualizati
on as 
domain 
model 
Alignment 
with 
modeling 
languages 
Asset–
related 
concept 
coverage 
Risk-
related 
concept 
coverage 
Risk 
treatment-
related 
concept 
coverage 
Visible impact of 
implemented 
requirements 
DITSCAP 
DM 
+ + +/- + - - 
ISSRM DM + + + + + + 
 
2.5   Summary 
We select the ISSRM DM for further contribution as it gives whole information for all 
concepts, when DITSCAP DM does not give any information about possible risk treatment 
and no differentiation between IS and business assets. ISSRM DM is the most suitable for 
our research as it could be extended with the help different security risk-oriented modeling 
languages. Moreover implementation of the suggested controls regarding to the chosen 
requirements could visibly prove the mitigation or reduction of vulnerability of the asset. 
Although DITSCAP Requirements DM is requirements directed, it does not give the full 
definition of assets, threats and vulnerabilities, which makes ISSRM DM more suitable for 
our research.  
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3 Security Risk-oriented Languages 
Now there exist many security risk-oriented modeling languages, such as Secure Tropos 
[40], KAOS extension to security [30], BPMN extension to security risk management [42], 
UMLsec [29], SecureUML [33], Misuse cases[43], Mal-activity diagrams [44] etc.  We 
will stop our attention on four modeling languages: Misuse cases, Mal-activity diagrams, 
BPMN, Secure Tropos. All these languages were previously aligned to ISSRM DM, what 
is suitable for us according to the Chapter 2.  
3.1   Comparison of security risk-oriented modeling languages 
Misuse cases [43] are an extension of use cases, in a way to detail common attempts to 
abuse the system. The misuse case diagram should be design for each malicious actor in 
order to show all possible abuses. The main goal of misuse cases is to describe the 
behavior that should not be allowed in the system [45]. The misuse case diagram extends 
use case diagram with 2 entities: misuse case and misuser. Misuse case is a sequence of 
actions that could be done by any person or software in order to harm the system. Misuser 
is the actor, who initiates the attack (misuse case). 
Mal-activity diagram (MAD) [44] is designed to show a harmful behavior of security 
attackers on the IS. Firstly, in the mal-activity diagram a normal process is built, and then 
it is added with a set of malicious behavior. Inappropriate behavior is shown through mal-
activities, mal-swimlane and mal-decision construct.  
Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) [42] is used for graphical representation of 
business processes flow in IS system. It shows specific business processes in a Business 
Process Diagram.  The main goal of BPMN is specifying the gap between the business 
process design and implementation. The BPMN application is divided into three usage 
level: analytical modeling, executable modeling, and descriptive modeling.   
Secure Tropos [40] supports modeling through 4 phases: early requirements analysis, late 
requirements analysis, architectural design and detailed design. It is based on iterative 
process: diagrams built on one phase are used to create diagrams on next phase. The whole 
process of modeling starts with identifying actors and list of goals for each actor. Then 
dependencies between the actors are defined, together with dependencies between actors 
and system. 
All four modeling languages have an alignment with the ISSRM DM [40, 42, 43, 44]. 
Detailed alignment is presented in the Appendix I. Since they have different syntax, they 
could be used in different situations. MAD will be taken for further consideration, as it 
gives the full picture of required IS. This modeling language specifies the malicious actor 
and his potential activities against the system. The final model gives step-by-step guide of 
the system against attacker actions.  
3.2   Mal-activity diagrams 
The MAD will be presented through one example based on CoCoME study case [19]. One 
risk will be taken under consideration and observed through 3 steps of the ISSRM process. 
This example shows the correspondence between the employees and server room, and the 
way of how unauthorized person could potentially harm the correspondence. The risk is 
giving unauthorized access into the server room. In another words it shows how an 
15 
 
entrusted employee gets an unauthorized access to the server room, because of absence or 
lack of access privileges, and messes up the product identifiers in a database, which leads 
to the loss of integrity of the product identifier list (PIL) and constrains the correct selling 
process for the whole store. The impact of the risk could harm the PIL; the server room is 
not reliable, since anyone can access it. The integrity of a PIL will be negated. Furthermore 
this risk leads to stop the operation of a whole store and loss of customer trust and loyalty. 
The vulnerability of the IS is the lack or absence of access privileges to server room. The 
risk could be mitigated through - implementation of access control – magnetic cards, doors 
with PIN codes, implementation of RBAC; and monitoring the entrance of the server 
room.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. MAD presentation of ISSRM asset-related concept 
Asset-related concept is presented in Figure 3.1. It is described through two swimlanes: 
Employee and Server room. In the Employee swimlane the business asset (database) is 
defined. Sever room swimlane shows the constructs that are needed to support execution of 
the workflow. There is no construct for security criterion, but from the definition of the 
assets it is understandable how they could be negated.  
In risk-related concept an Attacker presents the malicious actor and is defined through mal-
swimlane (see Figure 3.2). The attack methods are defined though mal-swimlanes (Social 
engineering and Hacker’s computer) and processes under this mal-swimlane (Request for 
access to server room and Change data in database). As an impact Refer to boss’ order, 
Connection of hacker’s computer to the server and Getting database credentials are 
defined. Unfortunately, the vulnerabilities are not presented in MAD as special element.  
In risk treatment-related concept, which is presented in Figure 3.3, countermeasures for the 
system are defined. The separate Security module swimlane is created, where all possible 
controls are mentioned. Security requirements are defined as Verification of identity and 
Checking access rights for identity. 
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Figure 3.2. MAD presentation of ISSRM risk-related concept 
 
Figure 3.3. MAD presentation of ISSRM risk treatment-related concept 
3.3   Summary 
In this chapter different modeling languages for SRM were reviewed (Misuse cases, MAD, 
Secure Tropos and BPMN). MAD was presented in more details and shown though 
example based on CoCoME study case. Moreover MAD was chosen for further 
contribution of this work, since among mentioned languages it has the biggest emphasis on 
the attack process and attacker behavior. In other words in helps to add malicious activity 
into normal work process. One more advantage to choose MAD as modeling language is 
that it has more smooth and continuous move between requirement engineering and 
design stage.    
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4 Enterprise Architecture Management 
There are different enterprise architecture frameworks, which show principles and 
practices for creation and usage of EA. The description of architecture consists of domains, 
layers or views. The model itself could be presented as matrix or diagram. To build the 
diagram, modeling language is needed, so this chapter is dedicated to different approaches 
to present EA. 
4.1   Enterprise Architecture Management Approaches 
Zachman framework [51] is EA framework, with the help of which formal and highly 
structured way of viewing and defining of an enterprise could be reached. It consists of a 
two-dimensional classification matrix. It is based on the intersection of six communication 
questions, which are What, Where, When, Why, Who and How, with five levels 
of reification, successively transforming the most abstract ideas into more concrete ideas. 
The basic idea behind the Zachman Framework is that the same complex thing or item can 
be described for different purposes in different ways using different types of descriptions 
(e.g., textual, graphical). This framework gives the 36 necessary categories for completely 
describing anything. The framework provides six different transformations of an abstract 
idea (not increasing in detail, but transforming) from six different perspectives. 
An important drawback is the large number of cells, which is an obstacle for the practical 
applicability of the framework. Also, the relations between the different cells are not that 
well specified. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, Zachman is to be credited with providing 
the first comprehensive framework for EA, and his work is still widely used. 
Generalized Enterprise Reference Architecture and Methodology (GERAM) [20] identifies 
the set of components recommended for usage in enterprise engineering. GERAM is an 
enterprise-reference architecture that models the whole life history of an enterprise 
integration project from its initial concept through its definition, functional design or 
specification, detailed design, physical implementation or construction, and finally 
operation to obsolescence. 
The model proposed by GERAM has three dimensions: the life cycle dimension, the 
instantiation dimension allowing for different levels of controlled particularization, and the 
view dimension with four views: Entity Model Content view, Entity Purpose view, Entity 
Implementation view, and Entity Physical Manifestation view. Each view is further refined 
and might have a number of components. 
Enterprise Architecture Meta-model [23] is divided in four main layers focusing on 
different levels of abstraction: business, the application layer, the technical layer and the 
physical layer. The different layers are interconnected by the associations of the meta-
model that crosses the layer boundaries. Furthermore it is possible to provide the various 
stake-holders with different views on the enterprise architecture that show only specific 
types of artifacts. 
ArchiMate [48] is one of the opened and independent enterprise EA modeling languages, 
which, with the help of business domains, supports the description, analysis and 
visualization of architecture. ArchiMate models follow a certain structure that is explained 
by means of an ‘analysis meta-model’. ArchiMate offers a common language for 
describing the construction and operation of business processes, organizational structures, 
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informational flows, IT systems, and technical infrastructure. An architecture framework is 
used to structure the concepts and relationships of the ArchiMate language. One of the 
objectives of the ArchiMate language is to define the relationships between concepts in 
different architecture domains. In ArchiMate there is three-layered view: the business, 
application and technology layers. Each layer is self-contained despite being a component 
of the integrated model, and caters to one or more architecture domains. 
4.2   ArchiMate 
The mail goal of ArchiMate is to make a connection between the business and IT systems 
within one enterprise. ArchiMate is an approach, which visualizes the different architecture 
domains and shows their relations and dependencies. It also provides structure in 
representation of layers of the system. ArchiMate brings the visual presentation of the 
system, which is easily could be brought through the time. ArchiMate could be presented 
through 2 viewpoints, which define structure of ArchiMate framework (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1. ArchiMate Framework adapted from [48] 
ArchiMate modeling language consists of 3 main types of elements: active structure 
elements, behavior elements and objects (passive structured elements). Active structured 
elements are business actor, application concepts and devices. They are designed to show 
the elements, which can perform the actions (behavior). Behavior elements show the 
activity which could be performed within an enterprise. Objects are elements on which the 
behavior is performed.  
ArchiMate could be also presented from layer perspective. There are three layers: business, 
application and technological. Business layer shows business processes, which bring 
products and services to external customer. Application layer provides different kind of 
application software and services, which support the business process from business layer. 
Technological layer mainly provides the structure of hardware of the system, which 
supports upper layer. However it could also have some software representation, if it 
supports application and business layers. Each layer of the ArchiMate model consists of 
different elements, which describe the behavior of this layer [48].  
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4.3   Illustrated example 
For contribution of the proposed method CoCoME is taken under consideration. We 
assume that before starting with proposed algorithm (see Chapter 5) of risk assessment, the 
ArchiMate model of the whole enterprise architecture is made and it covers all IS and 
business assets of an enterprise. To constrict the scope for the method implementation, we 
will take ArchiMate Server Room example based on CoCoME for further contribution. 
General ArchiMate model of Server room example base on CoCoME is presented on 
Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2. EA model of Server Room example built with ArchiMate 
Architecture model of server room presented on Figure 4.2 covers important hardware, 
which is used for maintenance of the business flow. Since this hardware is situated in the 
server room, the name of example is Server Room example. The hardware is supported by 
software, which is presented in the Software lane. Both Device infrastructure of server 
room and Software infrastructure lanes defines Technology layer of the enterprise. Only 3 
people from current enterprise can operate with presented devices and they are presented in 
the Roles lane. System administrator can control all processes like Install/Update software 
and Change network configurations. Manager has more rights to operate with the system 
(Edit/Delete/Update PIL, Add/View/Delete work documents, Add/Edit/View/Delete 
business secrets). Cashier has only special privileges (Get/View PIL) that he could not use 
them to misuse the system. In addition to Roles lane Business layer has Business processes 
lane, which presents the actions, which could be done on Business objects by Roles. 
Business objects and Business application objects are defined on Application layer of an 
EA model. This layer is a link between Technology and Business layer and defines 
business assets, which should be protected.  
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4.4   Mapping of ISSRM and ArchiMate 
The alignment of RM and EAM concepts is made through development of integrated 
metamodel [18]. The metamodel is built using main terms from 3 ISSRM concepts. A 
concept mapping introduces a correspondence between at least one concepts of each of the 
source models. A relation between two concepts could be presented in different ways, such 
as a generalization, a composition, an aggregation, an association, a classification. 
Equivalent concepts are integrated through an alignment rule (merge, mapping, 
abstraction). Different connection rules (generalization, aggregation, composition, 
association, classification) help to integrate related rules. Once the concepts are mapped, 
the rules (how) to integrate the concepts within the integrated metamodel are defined [18]. 
To present the current alignment it is necessary to use Motivation extension of ArchiMate 
modeling language, as there are no elements among standard ones that can present risk-
related and risk treatment-related concept of ISSRM.  
The mapping from Grandry et al. (2013) based on the same example, which was shown in 
Figure 4.2 (see Figure 4.3). The model is built around Product Identifiers List (PIL) 
business asset and risk that could occur during performing operations with PIL. The main 
security objective of PIL is Integrity of it and operation related to it. It is presented in 
Driver element in Figure 4.3. That’s why the risk for PIL business asset is Change data in 
PIL, which is presented through Assessment element. An impact that negates PIL’s 
integrity is Wrong query to PIL and it is also defined through Assessment. According to 
chain of impacts Wrong query to PIL leads to Wrong calculations for the system and Loss 
of customer loyalty. Software, as business asset that is connected to PIL, has vulnerabilities 
that make risk occurrence possible.  These vulnerabilities could be defined as Misusage of 
authority to get access and Session duplication allowance. The threat (Identity theft) and 
defined vulnerabilities lead the risk event (Entrance of malicious query). All elements from 
risk-related concept of ISSRM (apart security criterion) are presented through Assessment 
element.  
Risk treatment-related concept of ISSRM is presented though 2 additional elements: 
Requirement, which shows Security Requirements and Goal, which shows Risk Treatment. 
To mitigate defined risk, Enable event monitoring mechanism and Session duplication 
disallowance are presented as risk treatment. Risk requirements are defined through 
Implementation of event monitoring mechanism and Disallow session duplication. They 
are connected to the controls, which are presented in new separate lanes: Security 
processes and Security business objects. Security business objects lane provides model 
with Security objects element, where all new elements required for risk treatment are 
defined.  Security processes lane consists of processes, which help to operate with Security 
objects.  
4.5   Summary 
In this chapter different approaches for EA Management were presented. We select 
ArchiMate modeling language for further contribution as it provides structured information 
visualization. ArchiMate three-layered separation is not as complex as it is in Zachman 
framework, which makes it easier to build. ArchiMate modeling language is the most 
suitable for this research as it has alignment with previously chosen ISSRM domain model. 
This alignment is useful for the further contribution. The usage of ArchiMate was 
presented on the illustrated example. Moreover the application of Grandry et.al. (2013) 
approach is also presented in this chapter.  
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Figure 4.3. EA model of Server Room example based on Grandry et.al. (2013) approach 
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5 Alignment of Enterprise Architecture and Mal-activities 
5.1   Method overview 
To maintain the security level of the enterprise, its architecture must contain controls, 
which mitigate the risk occurrence and negate vulnerabilities. It is difficult to implement 
all possible countermeasures in a scope of one enterprise, as it will be costly. That’s why it 
is necessary to identify assets, the violation of which brings the greatest loss, or which are 
the most valuable for the enterprise. The step-by-step algorithm, how to make risk 
assessment, is presented in Figure 5.1. 
Through development of the EA model it is visible which assets has company already 
obtained and how are they connected between each other. ArchiMate is a chosen modeling 
language to build the required model. Moreover to the fact that it shows assets hierarchy, 
the processes behind these assets are also presented in this model. Roles and actors define 
who operates the system and which particular assets are under whose control.  
After EA model is finished it is necessary to identify the assets that must be protected. If 
there are no security controls implemented, all assets are needed to be taken under 
consideration one by one. As soon as vulnerable asset is identified, the risks that are related 
to this asset should be analyzed during the next step. This step could be done though 
drawing mal-activities diagrams, which will show how the asset could be attacked. 
Implementation of countermeasures also is shown in mal-activities diagrams.  
Next important step is returning from implementation of countermeasures of particular 
asset to building them in the overall EA. To see the influence of such additions, it is useful 
to add already created ArchiMate model with discovered controls. They could enhance the 
EA model through adding new assets. Since EA model is changing after each time of 
method implementation, the risk analysis process should be redone considering all 
additions and changes.  
 
Figure 5.1. Method algorithm diagram 
For method implementation we assume that analyst have whole EA model presented with 
ArchiMate. Apart alignments that will be define later the main rules in sequential order are 
presented here: 
1. Separate from the general ArchiMate model only those elements, which are 
connected to the chosen possibly vulnerable business asset and create new model. 
Moreover not only direct connections must be taken into account, but also connections, 
which occur through layers or other elements. This step is described more detailed in 
Chapter 5.2.2. 
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2. Transform model from step 1 into ISSRM asset-related activity diagram: 
a. Names of the roles go to names of swimlanes; 
b. Names of IS assets go to names of swimlanes. Only directly connected IS 
assets are taken into account on the first loop. If it is necessary to show the 
additional connections, they could be transferred into this diagram as soon 
as they become needed.  
c. Business processes are used in the swimlanes to show the workflow and 
express the connection between the swimlanes. The business process could 
appear only in that swimlane, the name of which is role’s name to which 
this business process is connected in ArchiMate model. 
d. The processes for swimlane with the IS assets name could be not found in 
the ArchiMate model.  They should be added at the discretion of the person 
who is applying this algorithm. 
3. Create of ISSRM risk-related MAD through adding activity diagram: 
a. Add “Attacker” swimlane and attack methods swimlanes; 
b. Specify the actions under “Attacker” swimlane, that attacker could make in 
order to violate the system; 
c. Define the influence of attackers actions on the actions defined in other 
swimlanes. 
4. Create ISSRM risk-treatment MAD through adding risk-related diagram: 
a. Add “Security module” swimlane; 
b. Specify the actions that should be done in order to mitigate the possibility of 
violation into the system; 
c. Define the influence of actions specified under “Security module” on the 
actions defined in other swimlanes. 
5. Transfer risk-treatment MAD to ArchiMate model: 
a. The information from “Security module” swimlane from MAD should be 
analyzed in order to separate the new IS assets from new business assets; 
b. If there are new IS assets, they should be put into Technical layer lane. New 
IS asset should be transferred into Technical layer of ArchiMate model. The 
connection between the new IS asset and business assets (new or existing) 
should be defined; 
c. One more lane of elements should be implemented on the business layer – 
“Security processes”. This lane will contain all processes determined in the 
“Security module” of risk-treatment MAD.  
d. From each of these processes define the business object that they use and 
add these business objects into “Security business objects” lane of 
ArchiMate model from step 2.  
e. Make suitable connections between elements. 
f. The connection between process and person (people), who will perform this 
operation, should be specified. 
5.2   Identification of Assets to Protect 
5.2.1   ArchiMate Alignment to ISSRM: Asset Model 
In terms of ISSRM asset-related concept, ArchiMate model specifies the IS and business 
assets. Although it contains information, which is required for building the asset-related 
MAD, there is no security criterion mentioned.  
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ArchiMate model proposes many elements to describe the EA. However the names of the 
elements differ from the ISSRM terms. To make risk assessment it is needed to map 
ArchiMate and ISSRM terminology. The mapping was done through analysis of the 
elements descriptions of both concepts. The alignment of the elements, which were used in 
our example, is presented in Table 5.1. The validity of alignment is supported by example 
description based on Server Room example. Business process as element of ArchiMate 
could be mapped to business asset from ISSRM DM, since Get/View PIL is an element, 
which defines to operations with PIL and describes the process essential to the business. 
Application service and Data object elements from Application layer of ArchiMate could 
be also mapped to Business asset element of ISSRM DM. The examples are: Software is 
service that shows automated behavior and describes the processes essential to the 
business; PIL is a passive element, which describes the information essential to the 
business and is suitable for automated process. Device and System software elements from 
ArchiMate Technology layer could be presented through IS asset of ISSRM DM. The 
validity is shown on examples: Server is a hardware resource, which stores or deploys for 
execution PIL, word documents, and business secrets in order to support business assets, 
which are defined in business process lane; OS is a software environment for deployment 
of PIL, word documents, business secrets in order to support business assets, which are 
defined in business process lane. Unfortunately there are no elements of ArchiMate 
modeling language that could be aligned to Security criterion element of ISSRM DM. 
The number of listed elements is enough to build simple EA model as it is done in the 
Figure 4.2. If it is needed to add the mapping for more elements, the analysis should be 
done in the same way. The approximate mapping is presented in the Table 5.2. The 
element alignment could vary depending on the particular example. 
Table 5.2. ArchiMate and ISSRM asset-related concept: general alignment 
ISSRM Archimate 
IS asset 
Node, Device, Network, Communication path, 
Infrastructure interface, System software, 
Infrastructure service, Artifact 
Technology layer 
Application component, Application collaboration Application layer 
Business 
asset 
 
Application interface, Application service, Data object Application layer 
Business collaboration, Business interface, Business 
function, Business interaction, Business event, 
Business service, Business object, Meaning, Value, 
Product, Contract 
Business layer 
Technical layer of ArchiMate gives an information about IS assets, which are used by the 
system to maintain the work process and support business assets. Although this level could 
be defined only over hardware devices, it is also possible to add the separate block with 
software. This mainly could be done for more clear separation between application and 
technical layers. Specification of the business assets is made on the application layer. 
Business processes show the actions, which could be done with assets. Business processes 
also help to make the connection between the business assets and roles (people who 
operate with these assets). Roles are not aligned to any of ISSRM terms. 
5.2.2 Asset Identification Example 
Application of previously proposed alignment to the Figure 4.2 gives us the Table 5.3. 
Implementation of proposed rules presents Device elements (Servers, Network devices and 
UPS) as IS asset. According to the alignment and Server Room example IS assets also 
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could be taken from System software (Database, OS, Firmware). Business assets could be 
presented though Application service, Data object or Business process elements. From 
Server Room example it is visible that Application services are Software and Services. 
Network configuration, PIL, Work documents and Business secrets are presented though 
Data object elements. Business process elements are used to define Get/View product 
identifiers list, Edit/Update/Delete product identifiers list, Add/View work documents etc.. 
Although each layer of the EA model could have vulnerabilities, for further contribution 
we will take the business layer. Since business assets from this layer are based on the 
assets from bottom layers, all improvements made for this layer have influence on the 
related elements through whole EA model.  
Table 5.1. ArchiMate and ISSRM asset-related concept alignment 
ISSRM definition ISSRM 
DM 
ArchiMate 
elements 
ArchiMate definition 
An element which describes 
the information, processes, 
capabilities and skills 
essential to the business and 
its core mission.  
Business 
asset 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
la
y
er
 Business 
process 
A behavior element that 
groups behavior based on 
an ordering of activities. 
It is intended to produce 
a defined set of products 
or business services. 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
la
y
er
 
Application 
service 
A service that exposes 
automated behavior. 
Data object A passive element 
suitable for automated 
processing. 
The IS component, valuable 
to the organization since it 
supports business assets. 
IS asset 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 l
ay
er
 Device A hardware resource 
upon which artifacts may 
be stored or deployed for 
execution. 
System 
software 
A software environment 
for specific types of 
components and objects 
that are deployed on it in 
the form of artifacts. 
The property or constraint on 
business assets describing 
their security needs, which 
are, typically, expressed 
through confidentiality, 
integrity and availability 
[38]. 
Security 
criterion 
- 
 
In case of Server Room example, which EA model is presented on Figure 4.2, business 
assets are defined in the Business processes lane: Edit/Update/Delete PIL, Get/View PIL, 
Install/Update software and Change network configurations etc.. Each of these elements 
from that lane should be taken under consideration, what makes the application of 
proposed method gradual. In other words, the method should be applied to each of the 
elements which present business asset on the business layer on the ArchiMate model.  
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The algorithm of risk assessment will be done based on the PIL as a business asset. Firstly, 
it is necessary to distinguish the elements, which are related to the chosen business asset. 
The relation could be identified not only through direct link, but also through layers. After 
the required elements and relations were identified, they should be separated in new EA 
model. This model is presented in the Figure 5.2. 
Table 5.3. ArchiMate and ISSRM alignment based on Server Room example 
ISSRM 
ArchiMate 
Element name Server Room ArchiMate model 
IS asset 
Device 
Servers 
Technology 
layer 
Network devices 
UPS 
System software 
Database 
OS 
Firmware 
Business 
asset 
Application service 
Software  
Application 
layer 
Services 
Data object 
 
Network configurations 
PIL 
Work documents 
Business secrets 
Business process 
Get/View product identifiers list 
Business 
layer 
Edit/Update/Delete product identifiers 
list 
Add/View work documents 
Delete work documents 
Add/Edit/View business secrets 
Delete business secrets 
Install/Update software 
Change network configurations 
The direct connections between PIL and its business processes (Edit/Update/Delete PIL 
and Get/View PIL) determine the connections to the Cashier and Manager in the Roles 
lane. Defined business asset has a relation link to Software. This connection gives the 
opportunity to follow the link to the IS assets which support PIL. Since there is a link 
between Software and Install/Update Software, the System Administrator role should be 
also transferred to the new ArchiMate model. All connections from System Administrator 
role should be also presented in the new ArchiMate model, even if they do not have direct 
connection to the chosen business asset.   
The transformations, which should be done in order to continue with risk assessment 
through proposed algorithm, could be summarized in following rules:  
1. Identify from Application layer the business asset, on which all further analysis will 
based; 
2. Define the elements, which are related to the chosen business asset. Elements 
relation could be defined through layers; 
3. Transfer chosen business asset and elements, which are related to it into separate 
EA ArchiMate model. 
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Figure 5.2. EA model of Server room example defined for chosen business asset 
5.3   Transformation to Mal activities 
 5.3.1   Transformation rules 
For further steps in risk assessment we need to make risk analysis. It could be done with 
the help of modeling language, which, in our case, is MAD. Unfortunately, the elements 
from ArchiMate modeling language and MAD are not the same, so it is necessary to make 
a mapping between them, that we can use the knowledge from the EA in the risk analysis.  
The link between these two languages is ISSRM concepts. The mapping of ArchiMate 
elements to the ISSRM terms partially was made in Chapter 5.2.1. The alignment between 
MAD and ISSRM is shown in the paper presented by Chowdhury et.al. [8]. The 
combination of these two alignments gives the general set of mapping rules between MAD 
and ArchiMate. The summarized alignment is presented in the Table 5.4. This mapping is 
done only for elements, which are used in Server Room example. If there were more 
elements in use in ArchiMate EA model, the alignment should be done in the same way. 
The mapping for ISSRM asset-related concept is presented in Table 5.4. Device and 
System software, as elements of ArchiMate, could be presented though swimlane in MAD. 
MAD elements such as Activity and Decisions, which are connected using ControlFlow 
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constructs, could present Application service, Data object and Business process from 
ArchiMate elements. 
Table 5.4. Alignment between ArchiMate and MAD: asset-related concept 
ISSRM ArchiMate 
Element name 
MAD 
IS asset 
Device 
Technology layer - Swimlane 
System software 
Business 
asset 
Application service 
Application layer 
- Activity, Decision 
(connected using 
ControlFlow constructs) 
Data object 
Business process Business layer 
5.3.2   Transformation example 
The outcome of the first step in proposed Server room example is shown in the Figure 5.2. 
The application of the proposed transformation algorithm should be applied only to the 
elements, which are directly connected to a chosen business asset. As it was mentioned 
before, the PIL is the business asset on which the whole example analysis is be based on. 
The alignment in combination with proposed rules for chosen example is presented in the 
Table 5.5. Server is presented through ArchiMate Device element, which after 
transformation into MAD becomes a Swimlane with name Server. Request to View/Get 
PIL and Request to Edit/Update/Delete PIL are shown as Activity elements of MAD and 
present Business process ArchiMate element. In Figure 5.3. business process, which are 
used in this example, are defined as View/Get PIL and Edit/Update/Delete PIL. To make 
process more precise before this operation will be completed, the request for this action 
should be done.  
Table 5.5. Alignment between ArchiMate and MAD based on Server room example 
ISSRM ArchiMate 
element name 
MAD element 
name 
Example 
IS asset Device Technology layer - Swimlane Server 
Business 
asset 
Application 
service Application layer 
- Activity, 
Decision 
(connected 
using 
ControlFlow 
constructs) 
-Request to View/Get PIL; 
-Request to 
Edit/Update/Delete PIL; 
- View/Get PIL; 
- Edit/Update/Delete PIL. 
Data object 
Business 
process 
Business layer 
The roles, which have direct connections (even through layers), are transferred into the 
name of the swimlanes: Cashier, Manager and System administrator. Server is one more 
swimlane, which is added, in asset-related diagram, since it also has direct through-layered 
connection with the PIL. There are many different actions behind every business process. 
That’s why to get the required business process done, it is necessary to start with request 
for doing this process. It is visible from Figure 5.3. There are activities Request to 
View/Get PIL and Request to Edit/Update/Delete PIL. After the sequence of processes 
from server part is completed, the roles (Cashier and Manager) will get the process 
View/Get PIL and Edit/Update/Delete PIL respectively. The person who is doing the risk 
analysis should think through the set of actions, which are done from the server side, in 
order to serve the requested process. This information is not presented in the EA model.  
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Figure 5.3. MAD asset-related model for Server room example 
5.4   Security Risk Management using Mal-activities 
The further analysis of the asset-related concept should be done through basic MAD 
algorithm. The next diagram that should be made is risk-related MAD. With the help of 
this diagram the attack algorithm is presented. After vulnerable points, where the risk can 
occur, are defined, risk-treatment diagrams should be built. It contains “Security module” 
that defines security control and shows the ways, how the risk could be mitigated. 
The asset-related MAD diagram is transferred to the risk-related diagram without any 
changes. During diagram building, analyst should think through on which level the risk 
could occur and which process could influence on its occurrence. The attack could be 
planed beforehand, how it is shown in the Figure 5.4.a. and 5.4.b. Attacker sends email to 
different people from the system (Cashier and Manager). Attacker also could send an 
email to System administrator, but it will not have any influence on PIL, as System 
administrator does not operate with PIL. The system is built in a way that Cashier does not 
have Internet access on his/her work computer. That’s why if Attacker applies social 
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engineering and sends email to Cashier, Cashier could open it only on his/her own private 
computer and it will not influence on the system. However Manager has his/her email 
account on the work computer, which makes the attack method through sending email with 
malicious attachment available. If the attack was successful and Manager opened email on 
his/her work computer, the installation of the keylogger starts. We assume that there are no 
countermeasures preinstalled which can prevent installation. After installation is finished, 
keylogger starts to monitor all the input of the Manager. Eventually the Manager will try 
to access the database with PIL through special software, which requires authentication. As 
soon as he/she will enter his/her credentials, the keylogger will get it. The Attacker just 
needs to analyze the data and as soon as he/she will see the required for him/her 
information, send it to him/her. After the Attacker obtains the credential for access the 
database, he/she can duplicate the session, enter the obtained credentials and get access to 
the confidential documents (PIL). We assume that the goal of the attacker is to mess up the 
PIL. That’s why as soon as he/she gets access to the database, he/she create a request to 
insert malicious data into a database. It becomes possible through SQL injection.  
Secondly, after risk-related diagram is built, analyst should think about countermeasures 
that will help to prevent the risk occurrence. Risk treatment-related concept is presented on 
Figure 5.5.a and 5.5.b “Security module” is implemented for these purposes. Different 
countermeasure actions are presented in “Security module” lane. The first implemented 
control is Enabled email filter and antivirus. It influences on email delivery. If the control 
is implemented correctly, it should monitor the malicious attachments in emails. That’s 
why the Manager should not Receive the email with malicious attachment at all. However 
if it happened, there are more controls to detect the malicious activity. If Manager still 
received the email with malicious attachment and opened it, The silent installation mode of 
keylogger should not be allowed. In other words, only System Administrator must have 
right to install the software to employee’s computers. Even if the keylogger was installed, 
it should not be able to send the obtained information. This could be mitigated through 
traffic scanner. If the credential were obtained through another place, the misuser should 
not be able to duplicate the session. Usually attacker is working from the external network, 
so there should be alert turned on in order to detect the violation from the external 
network. All changes and manipulations with the database should be logged in the log files. 
5.5   Transformation to ArchiMate 
 5.5.1   ArchiMate Alignment to ISSRM: Risk treatment-related concept 
The risk-related concept is made on the basis of ISSRM asset-related concept. Since there 
is no data, which could be transferred from ArchiMate to risk-related concept, there is no 
need for alignment between this concept and ArchiMate. The next mapping that is required 
for further analysis is alignment between ArchiMate and ISSRM risk treatment-related 
concept (see Table 5.6). This mapping will be used on the last stage of the algorithm.  
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Figure 5.4.a. MAD risk-related model for Server Room example 
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Figure 5.4.b. MAD risk-related model for Server Room example 
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Figure 5.5.a. MAD risk treatment-related model for Server Room example 
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Figure 5.5.b. MAD risk treatment-related model for Server Room example 
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Security requirement as element of ISSRM DM is aligned to the Business process 
ArchiMate element. Proving the right of mapping could be done through definition of 
elements from Server Room example. Check session duplication is an element that shows 
the behavior based on ordering of activities (operating with business assets) and provides 
the condition that session should be checked on its duplication in order to mitigate risks. 
Control element of ISSRM DM could be presented though 2 ArchiMate elements. One is 
Data object from Application layer and second is System software from Technology layer. 
The examples are as following: Session is a passive element suitable for automated process 
and it is designed to improve security specified by a security requirement (the session 
should be checked on its duplication); Traffic scanner is software for specific types of 
objects (traffic) and it is design to improve security in a way of monitoring the traffic. 
Since it is difficult to show risk treatment decision in visual concept, there is no construct 
in ArchiMate determining risk treatment element from ISSRM DM.  
Table 5.6. ArchiMate and ISSRM risk treatment-related concept general alignment 
ISSRM 
definition 
ISSRM DM 
elements 
ArchiMate 
elements 
ArchiMate definition 
A condition over 
the phenomenon 
of the 
environment that 
we wish to make 
true by installing 
the IS [12]. 
Security 
requirement 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
la
y
er
 
Business 
process 
 
A behavior element that groups 
behavior based on an ordering of 
activities. It is intended to produce 
a defined set of products or 
business services. 
A designed 
means to improve 
security, 
specified by a 
security 
requirement and 
implemented to 
comply it [12]. 
Control 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
la
y
er
 
Data 
object 
A passive element suitable for 
automated processing. 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
ic
al
 
la
y
er
 
System 
software 
A software environment for 
specific types of components and 
objects that are deployed on it in 
the form of artifacts. 
A decision of 
how to treat the 
identified risk 
[12]. 
Risk 
treatment 
 
5.5.2   Transformation rules 
The last step of the algorithm requires transformation back from MAD to ArchiMate 
model. On this step MAD presents ISSRM risk treatment-related concept. Alignment for 
this concept, based on the chosen example, is presented in Table 5.7. Decision and 
Mitigation activity combined using control flow as MAD elements could show Business 
process, Data object and System software elements of ArchiMate. Unfortunately there are 
no constructions in ArchiMate to present Swimlane, which shows Control element of 
ISSRM DM.  
 
Table 5.7. Alignment between ArchiMate and MAD for risk treatment-related concept 
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ISSRM MAD ArchiMate 
Element name 
Security 
requirements 
Decision and 
Mitigation activity 
combined using 
control flow 
Business process Business layer 
Data object Application layer 
System software Technological layer 
Control Swimlane - 
Risk treatment - 
5.5.3   Risk treatment in ArchiMate 
After risk assessment was made, it is necessary to make the reverse transformation from 
MAD diagram, which contains controls and countermeasures, to ArchiMate to see, on 
which layer the controls will occur. The implementation of the countermeasures in the EA 
shows on which assets will these controls influence and the connections between already 
existed and new assets. The alignment for application of this transformation is presented in  
Table 5.6. The implementation of these mappings on Server Room example is defined in 
Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8. Alignment between MAD and ArchiMate based on Server Room example 
ISSRM MAD ArchiMate 
Element name 
Example 
Security 
requirements 
Decision and 
Mitigation 
activity 
combined using 
control flow 
 
Business 
process 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
la
ye
r 
Send/Receive email 
Enable email filtering 
Allow only to install software 
Enable traffic scanner 
Check for session duplication 
Enable alert when login from 
external network 
Turn logging level up 
Data object 
A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
la
ye
r 
Email 
Permissions 
Session 
Traffic 
Log files 
System 
software 
T
ec
h
n
o
lo
g
y 
la
ye
r 
Traffic scanner 
Control Swimlane  - 
Risk treatment - 
According to the Server Room example the mapping could be implemented like this: 
Business processes like Send/Receive email, Enable email filtering, Allow only to install 
software etc. are presented as Decision and Mitigation activity elements of MAD 
combined using control flow. Same MAD elements also could define Data objects 
elements like Email, Permissions, Session etc. and System software element (Traffic 
scanner).  
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Transferring the alignment, presented in Table 5.8, into the actual model is not so easy, as 
analyst should think carefully, where the element would appear. One more important point 
is that Table 5.8 does not cover the connections between the elements. This point of EA 
model developing is up to analyst understanding.  
EA model of Server Room example after implementation of the method is presented in 
Figure 5.6. The main element, which was added to this model, is “Security processes” lane, 
which is a buffer between the business processes and business objects. Now before getting 
the PIL through Get/View PIL or Edit/Update/Delete PIL, the sequence of security process 
will take place. Besides “Security processes for operations with PIL” there are two more 
security processes which appear because of possible malicious action from the attacker. 
They present general controls, which help to keep system secure: Enable email filtering 
and Allow only admin to install software. Since there was no business process related with 
emailing process, Send/Receive email process was added in “Business processes”. 
“Business objects” lane is added with elements, which were defined through. Each 
security process from “Security processes” lane operates with business object. Analyst 
needs to think through which assets it is, and if there is none already presented in the EA 
model, add it in the “Business objects” lane. From Figure 5.6 it is visible that these 
elements are: Email, Permissions, Session, Traffic, Log files. Traffic scanner was added to 
“Software infrastructure” lane as it is IS asset, which supports business asset (Traffic).  
5.6   Summary 
This algorithm gives the help hints in the whole risk assessment process. However it could 
be modified for the particular problem of the IS of an enterprise.  
The presented steps should be applied to each of the business assets. According to the 
algorithm the number of business assets will grow with each loop of analysis. This will 
happen, since after reverse transformation from MAD to ArchiMate countermeasures from 
MAD will be presented as business assets in ArthiMate. Eventually all business assets will 
be covered, so this will be a sign that full analysis was made. 
The fact that analysis was made once does not give any proof that the system could not be 
violated. The countermeasures should be revised periodically. The implementations of new 
assets or extension of the business should be immediately added to the general EA model. 
The analysis should be repeated, if there was a breach in the security system of an 
enterprise. 
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Figure 5.6. EA model of Server Room example after method implementation 
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6 Validation 
In this chapter we validate the different concepts of alignment between EA and SRM. The 
original concept is presented by Grandry et al. (2013) and proposes the alignment through 
mapping ArchiMate EA model and ISSRM DM. To make the alignment full, Motivation 
extension of ArchiMate is required to be used. The outcome of application of this concept 
is presented in Figure 4.3. 
The second concept, which is going to be used in validation, is concept from current work. 
The same as in previous concept, ISSRM DM is used as main SRM concept. ArchiMate is 
taken as modeling language to present EA. Unlike aforementioned approach, the method, 
proposed in this work, uses one more intermediate step to make the alignment more clear. 
For implementation of this step MAD is being used. That’s why one of the outcomes of the 
current method is the alignment between ArchiMate and MAD. This intermediate step 
helps to perform risk analysis very carefully. The EA model after implementation of this 
method is presented in Figure 5.6. 
6.1   Research question and method 
The main validation question could be formulated as: Which method of alignment between 
EA and SRM is more complete and precise? To answer this question we will go through 
the steps presented in Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1. Validation steps 
Approach presented by Grandry et. al. (2013) is using ArchiMate as a modeling language 
to design EA model. For making risk analysis based on developed model, usage of 
standard ArchiMate modules is not enough. For this purpose Motivation extension of 
ArchiMate is being used. It helps to present elements of risk-related and risk treatment-
related concepts of ISSRM. However controls and countermeasures are shown through 
standard modules.  
Although method presented in this work is also using ArchiMate for modeling EA model, 
it does not require any extra ArchiMate modules. It is only necessary to make one 
additional alignment to present risk-related concept of ISSRM. It is done though MAD, 
which shows steps of attacker very precise. Risk treatment-related concept of ISSRM is 
also presented through MAD. It helps to implement the mitigation countermeasures on 
each malicious step of the attacker. That’s why it gives broader picture of possible 
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controls, which could be implemented in the system in order to mitigate risk occurrence. 
The transformation back from MAD to ArchiMate gives the presentation of chosen 
countermeasures in the whole EA.  
6.2   Summary of results 
The application of both aforementioned concepts provides risk analysis and proposes 
countermeasures to implement into system in order to mitigate the risks. The comparison 
of results is done based on outcome of two methods; in particular achieved EA models (see 
Figure 4.3 and 5.5). We assumed that attacker wants to enter malicious data into PIL. 
Through approach presented in this work we can see the sequence of actions that attacker 
should accomplish in order to make the attack successful. Moreover in Figure 5.3 it is 
shown how attacker’s actions influence on the normal business processes flow. In case of 
approach propose by Grandry et. al. (2013) it is only visible to which asset the risk is 
related and which vulnerabilities are presented in the system. Unlike the method presented 
in this work, Grandry et. al. (2013) approach does not show all possible ways of attack on 
chosen asset.  
The main difference, which is visible from the outcome figures (see Figure 4.3 and Figure 
5.6), is that Figure 5.6. also presents general controls, when Figure 4.3 covers only 
countermeasures related to the chosen asset.  In Security processes lane in Figure 5.6 there 
are two more additional elements that covers general security requirements. Through risk 
analysis, which was made for a particular asset, it turned out that there is no email filtering 
and there are no permission restrictions for software installation.  In case of Grandry et. al. 
(2013) approach these countermeasures are not covered, as there were no related threat and 
vulnerability detected. Approach presented in this work detects more threats and 
vulnerabilities than Grandry et. al. (2013) approach. Grandry et. al. (2013)  method is 
more general and provides controls related only to the asset, which was chosen to protect. 
However the concept presented in this work shows more possible ways to attack the 
system, that’s why it brings more controls and countermeasures definition.  
Talking about complexity of visual presentation of outcome, approach defined in this work 
presents EA model in more structural and understandable way than Grandry et al. (2013) 
method. In order to present risk-related and risk treatment-related concepts of ISSRM, 
method proposed by Grandry et. al. (2013) requires usage of additional module of 
ArchiMate. Implementation of elements from this module is not structured in lanes, what 
makes relations and general representation more complex for understanding. If Grandry et. 
al. (2013) approach is applied to all assets of the system, the EA model will just explode (it 
will be impossible for person to keep track of the assets, controls and relations). Although 
method proposed in this work enhances after each application loop, it keeps structured 
representation of information. The elements could occur only within the lanes, what makes 
the relations and connection visible and understandable.  
As it was mentioned before, approach proposed in this work does not need any additional 
modules from ArchiMate to present elements, which are required for risk analysis. On 
another hand, it needs one more alignment (between MAD and ArchiMate), which is not 
required in case of Grandry et. al. (2013) approach. This alignment separates the risks, 
which are related to particular asset and provides the countermeasures within the scope of 
chosen asset. Proposed approach makes risk analysis structured and shows all possible 
attacks on chosen asset. After risk analysis is done, method from current work provides the 
description of how countermeasures should be implemented back to the original EA and 
shows, how they are connected to the already existed assets and operations. In approach 
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proposed by Grandry et. al. (2013) risk analysis and countermeasures implementation are 
done in one model, which, in case of big example, will make model not understandable. 
Implemented countermeasures for one asset are not visible as risk-mitigation controls, due 
to not structured representation. Moreover the usage of EA model for risk analysis (in 
Grandry et.al. (2013) concept) does not give a possibility to look though all possible attack 
scenarios, when in case of approach presented in this work all malicious activities could 
be designed on MAD stage.  
It is difficult to mitigate all risks, which can occur within operation with one asset, but it is 
necessary to take into account all of them and decide which is the most harmful. Building 
MAD brings sequential presentation of operations from the IS asset side and how these 
operation are related to business processes of the system. For understanding of IS asset 
operations analyst should have IT background. However in case of Grandry et. al. (2013) 
approach person, who implements the concept, just need to have good understanding of 
business flow and EA structure. The requirement for IT knowledge brings approach 
presented in this work strong application limitation.  
6.3   Discussion 
Based on the results from previous sub-chapter it is visible that with the help of additional 
alignments (ArchiMate to MAD and back) the concept defined in this work shifts the 
complexity of risk analysis from EA modeling language to risk-oriented modeling 
language. All risk analysis will be done separately based on information from EA model. 
Despite countermeasures decisions are also done separately from EA model, they easily 
could be transferred back and do not have influence on the structured representation of the 
EA model.  
Usage of MAD in the concept, which is defined in this work, as special risk-oriented 
modelling language, negates the limitation of leakage of expressions in order to show the 
risk. ArchiMate Motivation extension, which is used in approach presented by Grandry 
et.al. (2013), does not have big variety of elements for presentation of risk-related and risk 
treatment-related concepts of ISSRM.  
6.4   Threats of validity 
One of the main threats of validity for method presented in this work is size of example. 
Due to lack of time the approach was applied only to one business asset and already 
enhanced the size of the overall model. Application of the method on the very big EA 
model could enlarge the model to the size that it will be difficult to keep track on it. 
Optimization of proposed method is not presented in this work and remains for future 
research. There is need to ask people to apply current method accordingly to defined rules 
to make us understand the weak points of proposed approach. Unfortunately, it was not 
done yet due to lack of time. 
One more limitation of this research is subjectivity. The subjectivity of analyst, who is 
applying proposed approach, could influence on the outcome of the method 
implementation.  There are some points in the concept rules, which are left for analyst 
definition. That’s why his/her understanding of the whole EA and business process in 
particular enterprise will influence on the outcome of risk analysis.  
Last but not least threat of validity is availability of information to perform risk analysis. 
Approach, presented in this work, helps to align business and IT part of enterprise. If the 
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analysis will be done by business related person, he/she could be just lack of IT-related 
information which is important to fulfill the alignment of presented concept. On another 
hand, IT-related analyst could not take into account risks related to business process. 
That’s why there should be good cooperation between experts from business and IT field 
to provide each other with required information for risk analysis.  
 6.5   Summary 
The validation was based on the Server Room example. The outcome models of Grandry 
et. al. (2013) concept and approach defined in this work were compared. Despite of the 
number of the additional models that should be designed in order to make risk analysis, 
approach presented in this works gives more complete result. Since it separates the risk 
analysis from EA modeling, it considers all possible attack methods that could be used 
against the system. Unlike the Grandry et.al. (2013) method, concept, defined in this work, 
maintains the structure representation of EA model and keeps it understandable for analyst.    
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7 Conclusions and future work 
In this work the method for alignment between the EA and SRM was defined. It was done 
though mapping of ArchiMate EA modeling language and MAD risk-oriented modeling 
language. The validation was based on comparison of the outcome models, archived after 
application of defined method and Grandry et.al. (2013) approach on Server Room 
example. The results of validation showed that despite the necessity for designing 
additional models for risk-analysis, the concept defined in this work presents more 
complete and precise outcome model.  
In this chapter the limitation of this work will be discussed. The conclusions and research 
question answer are also defined here. Last but not least, the recommendation for future 
work will be presented in the end of the chapter. 
7.1   Limitations 
The one of the limitations of this work is subjectivity. The rules and guidelines, which are 
defined in approach presented in this work, are based on our understanding of EA model. 
The example chosen for illustration of the method also made adjustments of the rules 
application. Thus, it might mean that some aspect of alignment between MAD and 
ArchiMate could be interpreted differently. The correction in mapping also could be based 
on the specific example to which the method is applied, as it involves the subjective 
decision on how to model the problem.  
Second limitation of this work is taking into account only vulnerabilities related to 
business assets.  It influences on the whole security level of an enterprise. The omission of 
developing risk-related MAD for IS assets makes system vulnerable even if all business 
assets related risks are mitigated.  
Talking about the used example, it is focus on specific attack methods (e.g., keylogger and 
SQL injection). However many other attacks could be also used in order to violate the 
system (e.g., man in the middle attack etc.). Although the example is taken from study 
case, which is based on real world example, the current approach was no applied on the 
real EA model. 
7.2   Conclusions 
7.2.1   The Institut Luxembourgeois de la Normalisation, de l'Accréditation  
Countermeasures that were implemented in illustrated example are taken from our own 
experience and are not based on any regulation document. However it would be nice to 
compare implemented controls with countermeasures proposed in regulation documents. 
Regulation documents provide enterprise engineers with information about control 
implementation for security maintenance. Among variety of available regulation 
documents (e.g., Basel II [4], The Institut Luxembourgeois de la Normalisation, de 
l'Accréditation (ILNAS) [22], Sarbanes-Oxley Act [49] and Directive 2009/140/EC [41]), 
the scope of requirements, which are identified in ILNAS, is the most suitable for our 
example. ILNAS discusses information security management system and operational 
management system.  
To verify the correctness of implemented controls, it is needed to check them accordingly 
ILNAS based criteria list. This list should be done by analyst who will apply the current 
method. He/she should read through ILNAS regulation document and verify if the 
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implemented controls are mentioned there. The main difficulty is the difference in 
terminology. Talking about illustrated example, the misusage of authority to get access is 
the system is discussed in “Security rights profile” chapter of ILNAS. Proposed in example 
logging alerts are mentioned in chapter “Monitoring mechanisms to identify logs”. The 
email filtering, which was defined in illustrated example could be determined through 
chapter “Mechanism for found and eliminating malicious code in the digital documents 
collected for archiving”.  
7.2.2   Answer to RQ 
The research question was identified in Chapter 1 and it sounds as “How to align 
Enterprise Architecture and Security Risk Management?”. To answer this question, firstly, 
we have investigated different RM concepts and approaches. After analysis and 
comparison ISSRM DM was chosen as SRM method. For visual presentation of risk-
oriented problem, MAD modeling language was chosen. ArchiMate is one of the 
approaches that could be used to build EA model. To align SRM and EA it is needed to 
make a mapping between modeling languages that are used to present these concepts. 
Hence, the alignment between MAD and ArchiMate should be done.  
7.3   Future work 
For future work it is necessary to negate all listed limitations that appeared in this paper. 
The main work that should be done is constructing transformation rules and extension of 
current approach for IS assets vulnerabilities. Actually, the sequence of steps and main 
rules will remain unchanged. The only thing that needs to be implemented in order to 
extend the current approach for mitigation of IS assets-related risks is transformation back 
rules from risk treatment-related concept to ArchiMate model.  
It is necessary to come up with same terminology for ILNAS and ArchiMate. Since 
verification of controls, implemented into the system, should be checked through 
regulatory documents, the criteria list should be identified based on ILNAS and analyst 
should just check if the countermeasures satisfy these criteria.   
The alignment between EA and SRM was based on two modeling languages (ArchiMate 
and MAD). However there are more languages for SRM presentation and each of them has 
it’s own perspective. The implementation of alignment of ArchiMate to other risk-oriented 
modeling languages (Secure Tropos, Misuse cases, BPMN etc.) will help to choose the 
most suitable alignment depending on the need of preferences of the analyst.  
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Appendix 
I. Alignment of modeling languages with ISSRM DM   
All four modeling languages should be observed regarding to the alignment with ISSRM 
DM. The observation will be based on the comparison according to the ISSRM DM 
constructs.  
The main terms of asset-related construct of ISSRM DM and the correspondence of 
analyzed languages are presented in Table I.1. The term asset in general stands for 
anything that has been valued for the organization and it is necessary for achieving its 
goals. Assets could be divided into IS and business assets [12]. Comparing the languages 
we can see that only BPMN has separated semantic for each term. Although misuse cases 
and mal-activity diagram also have specific syntax for IS asset, (e.g., misuse cases use 
system scope to determine IS assets and mal-activity diagrams use swimlane) they still do 
not specify business asset. Secure Tropos does not have at all separation of assets. It 
presents assets as combination of actor, hardgoal, resource and plan. The connection is 
made using dependency, contribution, means-ends, and decomposition links. 
Table I.1. Language correspondence to ISSRM regarding asset-related concept 
ISSRM Misuse cases Mal-activity 
diagrams 
BPMN Secure Tropos 
Asset  
 
 
Actor 
 
 
 
combined using 
extends and 
includes links 
 
 
 
Decision 
 
 
 
combined using 
control flow links 
 
 
 
 
 
  Event   Gateway 
combined using 
Sequence flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined together 
using dependency, 
contribution, means-
ends, and 
decomposition links 
 
Business asset  
 
Data Object 
IS asset  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Data Store 
Security 
criterion 
 
 
 
- 
 
Added to the 
business asset  
 
 
 
 
 
combined using 
contribution and 
security constraint 
decomposition links 
Security criterion is a property or constraint on business assets that characterizes their 
security needs [12]. In case of misuse cases and BPMN, it specifies exactly the place 
where security criterion is needed. Mal-activity diagrams do not specific syntax for 
security criterion at all, what makes them less understandable than misuase cases. Secure 
Tropos defines security criterion using security constraint and softgoal. 
System 
Use case 
Activity 
Task 
Swimlane 
P
o
o
l 
Actor 
Hardgoal 
Resource 
Plan 
Security 
constraint 
Softgoal 
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In Table I.2. the aforementioned languages correspond to the ISSRM DM regarding to 
risk-related concept. Risk is a combination of threat with one or more vulnerabilities 
leading to a negative impact harming one or more of the assets [12]. There is no syntax in 
any of analyzed languages that could allow expressing risk in one construction. In all of 
aforementioned languages risk could be defined as combination of event and impact 
constructions.  
Impact is a potential negative consequence of the risk that may harm assets when the threat 
is accomplished [12]. Misuse cases and mal-activity diagrams syntax gives us full picture 
of impact of the risk occurrence.  In misuse case it is presented using the impact construct. 
In mal-activity diagrams it is done through mal-activity construct, which is defined in the 
thread, expressed swimlane. In case of BPMN and Secure Tropos provision of the impact 
syntax is not so clear. BPMN specifies only harm of business asset, but not IS asset. 
Although Secure Tropos shows the negation of security criterion, it does not show the 
complete impact on the assets. 
Event is a combination of a threat and one or more vulnerabilities [12]. In all provided 
modeling languages there is no speared construction to express event. It could be done as a 
combination of threat and vulnerability. However Secure Tropos has additional construct 
that allow presenting this term. It is threat construct, apart from previously defined 
combination.  
Vulnerability is a characteristic of an IS asset that can contribute a weakness or a flaw in 
terms of IS security [12]. Misuses cases give the whole picture of vulnerabilities of the 
system. In mal-activity diagrams this term does not have at all separate syntax. In case of 
BPMN and Secure Tropos only vulnerability point could be identified.  
Threat is a potential attack, carried out by an agent that targets one or more IS assets and 
may lead to harm to assets [12]. In misuse case, mal-activity diagrams and BPMN there is 
not construct that defines threat. It could be done through combination of attack method 
and threat agent. However Secure Tropos determines threat combining hardgoal and plan, 
which are specified in treat agent construct.  
Attack method is a standard means by which a threat agent carries out a threat [12]. All 
languages provide full definition of attack method. In each case it is done by combination 
of several modeling constructs. Misuse cases provide it through misuse case construct, 
which is combined with other misuse cases using links. The same is done in Secure 
Tropos, but instead misuse case it have plan construction. Mal-activity and BPMN 
diagrams have more complicated syntax.  
Threat agent is an agent that can potentially cause harm to the assets of the IS [12].  In all 
languages there present clear construct, which identifies threat agent. Misuse cases specify 
it as misuser. Mal-activity diagrams show it as a mal-swimlane. BPMN determines threat 
agent as a pool. Secure Tropos provide information about threat agent through an actor 
construct.  
Table I.3 provides information about correspondences between languages and risk 
treatment-related concepts. Risk treatment is a decision of how to treat the identified risk 
[12]. Since it is difficult to show this decision in visual concept, there is no construct 
determining it.  
Security requirement is a condition over the phenomenon of the environment that should 
come true by installing the IS in order to mitigate risks [12]. The same as in specification 
of assets, it is done through combination of different constructs.  
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Control is a designed means to improve security, specified by a security requirement and 
implemented to comply it [12]. There are no constructs provided by misuse cases, BPMN 
and Secure Tropos. Only mal-activity diagrams could show control, which could be 
implemented through usage a swimlane, which will contain mitigation activities.  
Table I.2. Language correspondence to ISSRM regarding risk-related concept  
ISSRM Misuse cases Mal-activity 
diagrams 
BPMN Secure Tropos 
Risk  
Combination of Event and Impact 
Impact   
 
Contained in the 
malswimlane that 
expresses attack 
method 
 
 
 
 
Impacts 
Event  
Combination of Vulnerability and Threat 
 
 
 
 
 
Or combination of 
Vulnerability and 
Threat 
Vulnerability   
- 
 
 
 
added to the IS 
asset 
 
 
added to the IS 
asset 
Threat  
Combination of Attack method and Threat agent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attack method  
 
 
combined using 
includes and 
extends  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mal-decision 
 
 
combined using 
control flow 
Presented in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event   Gateway 
combined using 
Sequence flows 
 
 
 
combined with 
other Tasks using 
decomposition 
links 
Threat agent  
 
 
Misuser 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Impact Mal-activity 
Threat 
Vulnerabilit
y 
V 
Hardgoal 
Plan 
Misuse case Plan 
Task 
Mal-activity 
Mal-swimlane 
Mal-swimlane 
Actor P
o
o
l 
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Table I.3. Language correspondence to ISSRM regarding risk treatment-related concept 
ISSRM Misuse cases Mal-activity 
diagrams 
BPMN Secure Tropos 
Risk treatment - 
Security 
requirement  
 
 
 
 
 
combined using 
extends and 
includes links 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
decision  
 
 
 
 
combined using 
control flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Event   Gateway 
combined using 
Sequence flows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
combined using 
dependency, 
contribution, 
means-ends, and 
decomposition 
links 
Control -  
 
 
 
 
- 
Mal-swimlane 
Security 
use case 
Task 
Mitigation 
activity 
Actor 
Hardgoal 
Resource 
Plan 
Security 
constraint 
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